President-Elect Donald Trump has released his plans for his first 100 days in office. After outlining proposals for term limits, a trade war, and mass deportations, the plan includes the following paragraph on education policy:

School Choice And Education Opportunity Act. Redirects education dollars to give parents the right to send their kid to the public, private, charter, magnet, religious or home school of their choice. Ends common core, brings education supervision to local communities. It expands vocational and technical education, and make 2 and 4-year college more affordable.

The details are far from clear, but it appears that his education policy will focus on three areas:

1. School choice

Trump has the right instinct on school choice, but if he is planning to promote a national voucher program, then he’s going about it the wrong way. He has previously pledged to dedicate $20 billion in federal funds to school choice policies, and stated that he would “give states the option to allow these funds to follow the student to the public or private school they attend” as well as using federal carrots to get states to expand choice policies even further. Expanding educational opportunity is admirable, but using the federal government to do so is misguided. As David Boaz explained more than a decade ago in the Cato Handbook for Congress, the case against federal involvement in education:

is not based simply on a commitment to the original Constitution, as important as that is. It also reflects an understanding of why the Founders were right to reserve most subjects to state, local, or private endeavor. The Founders feared the concentration of power. They believed that the best way to protect individual freedom and civil society was to limit and divide power. Thus it was much better to have decisions made independently by 13–or 50–states, each able to innovate and to observe and copy successful innovations in other states, than to have one decision made for the entire country. As the country gets bigger and more complex, and especially as government amasses more power, the advantages of decentralization and divided power become even greater.

A federal voucher program would very likely lead to increased federal regulation of private schools over time, especially after a new administration takes over that is less friendly to the concept of school choice. As we’ve seen in some states, misguided regulations can severely undermine the effectiveness of school choice and induce a stifling conformity among schools. Moreover, as I’ve explained previously, those regulations are harder to block or repeal at the federal level than at the state level and their negative effects would be far more widespread:

When a state adopts regulations that undermine its school choice program, it’s lamentable but at least the ill effects are localized. Other states are free to chart a different course. However, if the federal government regulates a national school choice program, there is no escape. Moreover, state governments are more responsive to citizens than the distant federal bureaucracy. Citizens have a better shot at blocking or reversing harmful regulations at the state and local level rather than the federal level.

That said, the Trump administration can promote school choice in more productive and constitutionally sound ways. The federal government does have constitutional authority in Washington, D.C., where it currently operates the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP). The OSP should be expanded into a universal ESA that empowers all D.C. families to spend the funds on a wide variety of educational expenses in addition to private school tuition, including tutors, textbooks, online courses, curricular materials, and more, as well as save unused funds for later expenses, such as college. The Trump administration should explore similar options in areas where the federal government has jurisdiction, such as on Native American lands and military bases.

2. Common Core:

Yet again, Trump has the right instinct but the policy leaves much to be desired. Ending Common Core is a noble goal, but it is primarily a matter of state policy and at this point there is little the federal government can do about. As Neal McCluskey noted yesterday, “the main levers of [federal] coercion—the Race to the Top contest and waivers out of the No Child Left Behind Act—are gone.” The only way for the federal government to get rid of Common Core would be to engage in the same sort of unconstitutional federal coercion that critics of the Core opposed in the first place.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration could ease the path for states to ditch Common Core by merely refraining from using its authority under Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) to dictate state policy. As Neal explained:

What [Trump] can do—and I think, along with a GOP Congress, will do—is ensure that regulations to implement the ESSA do not coerce the use of the Core or any other specific standards or tests. This has been a real concern. While the spirit and rhetoric surrounding the ESSA is about breaking down federal strictures, the Obama education department has been drafting regulations that threaten federal control over funding formulas and accountability systems. And the statute includes language vague enough that it could allow federal control by education secretary veto. A Trump administration would likely avoid that.

3. College and Vocational Education

Here is where Trump’s plan is the murkiest. He wants to “expand” vocational education and make college “more affordable” but he does not explain how. His campaign website provideslittle more in terms of details:

• Work with Congress on reforms to ensure universities are making a good faith effort to reduce the cost of college and student debt in exchange for the federal tax breaks and tax dollars.

• Ensure that the opportunity to attend a two or four-year college, or to pursue a trade or a skill set through vocational and technical education, will be easier to access, pay for, and finish.

These vague bromides could just as easily have appeared on Hillary Clinton’s campaign website, which states:

• Every student should have the option to graduate from a public college or university in their state without taking on any student debt. By 2021, families with income up to $125,000 will pay no tuition at in-state four-year public colleges and universities. And from the beginning, every student from a family making $85,000 a year or less will be able to go to an in-state four-year public college or university without paying tuition.

• All community colleges will offer free tuition.

• Everyone will do their part. States will have to step up and invest in higher education, and colleges and universities will be held accountable for the success of their students and for controlling tuition costs.

So how will Trump try to expand vocational education and make college more affordable? It’s not clear. Ideally, Trump should work to phase out the various federal loan programs and higher ed subsidies that a mountain of research has shown are fueling rapid tuition inflation. Unfortunately, Trump has previously proposed an income-based student loan repayment plan. Such a policy could assist borrowers in repaying loans, but it would still create perverse incentives that fuel tuition inflation and overconsumption of higher ed while leaving the taxpayer on the hook for whatever the borrower couldn’t repay. When a student takes out a $35,000 loan to pursue a degree in puppeteering and then surprisingly can’t find a decent-paying job, taxpayers would pick up the tab.

At this point, it’s not clear what Trump will do about education policy. His education proposals are vague and somewhat disconcerting, but there is also evidence that he wants to move in the right direction, particularly regarding school choice and a reduced federal role in K-12 education. What Trump needs now is a set of good advisers to help guide his commendable education policy instincts toward wise and effective policy.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is poised to have the majority of its seats filled by Trump nominees.  Earlier this week SEC chair Mary Jo White announced she would be stepping down at the end of President Obama’s term. This is not in itself surprising.  The chair serves at the will of the president and it’s customary for the current chair to step aside and let an incoming president install a chair of his or her choosing.  What is remarkable however is the number of vacancies that leaves president-elect Trump to fill.

The five member commission has had two empty seats for over a year and a half now, following Republican Dan Gallagher’s resignation in May 2015 and the expiration of Democrat Luis Aguilar’s term the same month. Although President Obama nominated two candidates to fill those seats, Republican Hester Peirce and Democrat Lisa Fairfax, their confirmations have been stalled in congress.  (Like many similar commissions, the SEC must be politically balanced with no more than three seats filled by members of the same party.)  White’s resignation will therefore leave only two commissioners in office, Republican Michael Piwowar and Democrat Kara Stein. Until a new chair can be confirmed, it is likely that president-elect Trump will name Piwowar acting chair.  In the meantime, however, with only two commissioners, it is unlikely that the SEC will pursue any kind of ambitious agenda.

Looking forward to what the SEC might look like with its new members in place, it would be reasonable to hope for a less aggressive and more market-friendly agency than we have had under White’s direction.  Trump has sounded a decidedly deregulatory tone both in the course of the campaign, vowing to dismantle Dodd-Frank, and in the days since the election.  His pick of Paul Atkins, a former SEC commissioner known for his strong free-market bent, to head up part of his transition team also signals a commitment to paring back the voluminous regulations that have plagued the financial sector in recent years.

As far as concrete agenda items for a new chair, there are a number of regulations ripe for reform.

The U.S. capital markets have seen a marked decrease in the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in recent years, which many have attributed to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and its onerous reporting and internal controls requirements for public companies.  Under new direction, the SEC would be able to investigate what has been depressing interest in IPOs and to pursue strategies to reduce the regulatory burden as necessary.

Dodd-Frank imposed several disclosure requirements unrelated to companies’ profitability, a tactic former commissioner Gallagher has called “hijacking” the SEC’s disclosure regime. While many of these disclosure requirements cannot be repealed without an act of congress, the new SEC chair would have the authority to push back against any additional issue-of-the-day disclosures.  Senator Warren and others on the left have agitated for a requirement that companies disclose information about political spending; it is unlikely that an SEC chair picked by Trump or his team would pursue such a rule.

Finally, a highly technical rule known as Regulation NMS has long plagued the securities exchanges, even some have argued spawning the trading strategy known as “high frequency trading.”  A new chair would be well-positioned to reopen that regulation and to evaluate its potential unintended consequences.

“Well we’re living here in Allentown
And they’re closing all the factories down
Out in Bethlehem they’re killing time
Filling out forms
Standing in line
Well our fathers fought the Second World War
Spent their weekends on the Jersey Shore
Met our mothers in the USO
Asked them to dance
Danced with them slow
And we’re living here in Allentown.”

– Billy Joel, “Allentown,” 1982

Nearly 35 years after the release of Billy Joel’s wistful lament about the decline of iconic Bethlehem Steel and the selfless virtues of America’s “Greatest Generation” along with it – the U.S. steel industry may be getting the last laugh. Yesterday, former Nucor Steel CEO Dan DiMicco and longtime Washington trade attorney Robert Lighthizer, who has devoted much of his professional career to building walls between foreign steel and the U.S. companies that want to buy it, were appointed heads of President-elect Trump’s “Landing Team” at the Office of the United States Trade Representative.

To those who have been holding out hope that Trump’s anti-trade campaign bluster would moderate before it could be converted to policy, the selection of DiMicco and Lighthizer is pretty devastating news. Neither has met a tariff he didn’t like or a trade agreement he did. To the non-political staff at USTR, the DiMicco/Lighthizer duo must feel like a real poke in the eye. After all, the mission of the agency is “to work toward opening markets throughout the world to create new opportunities and higher living standards.” The staff is generally committed to trade liberalism and good will among nations and their sensibilities are informed by foreign service backgrounds.  DiMicco and Lighthizer bring an enforcement and prosecution ethos to the USTR, which will send a lot of the existing staff to the exits, while ensuring that the agency’s budget is devoted primarily to bringing complaints against our trade partners, rather than negotiating new and better deals.

Of course, Trump mistakenly cites the U.S. trade deficit as evidence that the United States is losing at trade.  We are losing, he bellows, because our trade agreements are disastrous. And, they are disastrous, he reasons, because U.S. negotiators always get outsmarted by their crafty foreign counterparts. What better way not to get outsmarted than to appoint people who would take a wrecking ball to existing agreements instead of crafting new ones?

For reasons unsupported by facts, DiMicco abhors the North American Free Trade Agreement and wants it shredded.  He also wants the United States to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership – which, yesterday, became one of Trump’s Day One priorities. Trump has been outspoken about his intentions to declare China a currency manipulator and to respond with punitive unilateral measures. To the extent that Trump’s actions are constrained by U.S. treaty commitments under the World Trade Organization, Lighthizer has a long history of challenging the veracity of the WTO dispute settlement system, which he claims embodies an anti-American bias. He has long advocated for closer scrutiny and, if warranted, U.S. withdrawal from the WTO.

Ten years ago, I debated Lighthizer in this week-long back-and-forth hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations. His affinity for wanting to bend the WTO to be more responsive to U.S. demands (i.e., “All animals are equal but some are more equal than others”) was very much on display then.

The U.S. steel industry has been one of America’s most protectionist and litigious industries for more than a century. Its model was never to compete on economics or commercial considerations. It was always to invest in K Street and use the levers of politics to cordon off the U.S. market for domestic steel. As a trade attorney, Lighthizer brought hundreds of antidumping and countervailing duty cases against foreign producers with the aim of raising the cost of foreign steel to downstream, steel-consuming U.S. industries, such as appliance, automobile, and pipe and tube manufacturers. Often testifying in hearings before the U.S. International Trade Commission, where Lighthizer argued for the imposition of tariffs, was Dan DiMicco, in his capacity as Nucor CEO.

It’s not that the steel industry isn’t entitled to its day in court. The problem is that the industry’s interests are so overrepresented in Washington. After all, “primary metal” manufacturing (which is a sector that includes more than just steel-making) accounted for $56 billion of value-added output last year. That’s a lot – until you recall that total value-added in the U.S. economy last year (GDP) was over $18 trillion. In other words, the direction of the administration’s trade policy is being shaped by two men who speak on behalf of interests that account for less than 0.3 percent of the U.S. economy. What about agricultural interests?  What about the tech industry? Pharmaceuticals? Equipment manufacturers? Professional services? Will the interests of the other 99.7 percent of the U.S. economy have a voice in the formulation of trade policy?

Most of us don’t live in Allentown.