Tag Archives: federal debt ceiling

Does Wal-mart charge us $100 to enter and they choose what we get? Same unsatisfying result when Congress raises debt ceiling!!

“If Wal-Mart charged you $100 to enter its stores and then told you what you were going to get for the money, it would not be a satisfying experience, yet, this is precisely how the U.S. government operates.”

Sadly that has been the way our government has been operating for years and now we all have over 46,000 dollars of debt for each member of our household and we still don’t feel satisfied with what we are getting.

Time for a Constitutional Fix

by Richard W. Rahn

This article appeared in The Washington Times on August 16, 2011.

Can an amendment to the U.S. Constitution fix the deficit problem? Polls show most Americans think we need a balanced-budget amendment. Yet serious scholars of the issue understand that the deficit is merely a symptom of the problem; people want more benefits from government than they wish to pay for.

Various forms of balanced-budget and tax-and-spending-limitation amendments have been proposed. Almost everyone realizes that an amendment must be flexible enough to deal with national emergencies, such as a major war. But if the amendment is too flexible, politicians will quickly find ways around whatever limitations on spending, taxing and deficits are imposed. The more tightly drawn any proposed amendment is, the more difficult it will be to pass it because an effective amendment will limit the powers of the very people who are required to vote for it. As the country considers what type of structural fix is doable, the observations of some leading scholars are worth pondering.

Political economist Lawrence Hunter, who has held senior policy positions both in and out of government, has been working on the issue for a couple of decades. Mr. Hunter just wrote inForbes, “The Father of the U.S. Constitution, James Madison, understood that any constitutional provision without self-enforcing mechanisms attached to it constitutes a mere ‘parchment barrier’ and simply would be ignored and discarded by [the political class]. … Madison laid out a framework in Federalist No. 51 for competition among political and legal actors with the national government as a means of checking and balancing the exercise of power by the various branches: ‘Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.'” Mr. Hunter thinks it is an open question when, if ever, the political class will get to the point where it will pass an effective, self-enforcing limitation on taxing, spending and debt.

Without a clear amendment, overspending will continue…

John McClaughry, who was a senior policy adviser in the Reagan White House, has come up with an interesting idea, which was published in the AmericanThinkerin May, that he calls Proposition 20. Mr. McClaughry would limit the total amount of federal debt to $20 trillion. Setting an absolute amount makes the calculation unambiguous, unlike most other proposals that refer to some percentage of gross domestic product or other less precise numbers. The United States has a gross debt of about $15 trillion, so the proposal would give Congress several years to get its house in order and give adequate time for the states to ratify it. Mr. McClaughry would allow the issuance of additional debt if, and only if, Congress formally declared war, and only while the armed forces were engaged in combat.

Maurice P. McTigue, a former New Zealand Cabinet minister who is a distinguished visiting scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, has been working on improving government accountability around the world ever since he was a key player in New Zealand’s economic reforms of two decades ago. He has spent considerable time identifying which reforms have worked in various countries and how their successes might be transferred elsewhere. Mr. McTigue notes that a major part of the problem of lack of government fiscal responsibility is the fact that virtually no one knows how much the various government services actually cost. Thus, a key to improving government accountability is to work on ways of ensuring that the public knows what it is getting for each dollar spent on various programs.

When all government revenue (Social Security taxes, personal income taxes, corporate taxes and a never-ending list of excise taxes and fees) goes into the same pot — which is the case now — and then the money is allocated by Congress according to political considerations, any connection between what is being paid and the “service” on which it is spent becomes increasingly remote. If Wal-Mart charged you $100 to enter its stores and then told you what you were going to get for the money, it would not be a satisfying experience, yet, this is precisely how the U.S. government operates.

Richard W. Rahn is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and chairman of the Institute for Global Economic Growth.

More by Richard W. Rahn

As we struggle to try to devise a constitutional fix to the structural problem of destructive debt, spending, regulation and taxation, it would be useful to consider the following:

1. All government insurance (incorrectly called “entitlements”) and trust programs must be privatized or fully funded from specifically identified and allocated taxes and fees that cannot be diverted to pay for other government programs and must be managed by independent officials who will be legally at risk for not fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities.

2. Every government expenditure, no matter how small, must be funded from an identifiable stream of revenue — taxes, fees, asset sales or other — and the same dollars may not be spent on more than one item.

3. No new or expanded government program or activity may be enacted into law without a specific source of funding attached to it, and the program or activity may not spend more than funds provided by the identified tax or fee.

The U.S. Constitution was written in response — after vigorous and learned debate — to the problems arising out of the original Articles of Confederation. It appears that a constitutional fix is needed to deal with ongoing fiscal problems the country faces. A vigorous debate has begun, and that is all to the good.

Is Ron Paul the only Republican who does not want to kick the can down the road?

When I hear all these big numbers that the Republicans want to cut trillions out a long time from now but very little out this year. It appears to me that they are cowards. Ron Paul is different though. President Obama is scared to cut too.

Kick the Can or Kick the Habit?

by Jagadeesh Gokhale

Jagadeesh Gokhale is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, member of the Social Security Advisory Board, and author of Social Security: A Fresh Look at Policy Options University of Chicago Press (2010).

Added to cato.org on July 19, 2011

This article appeared on The Daily Caller on July 19, 2011

President Obama’s dire alarms over the approach of the federal debt ceiling, and subsequent calls for $4 trillion in debt reductions over 10 years, are starkly lacking key ingredients: substance and coherence as to what such a fiscal package should contain.

House Republicans, by contrast, have a program for long-term economic stewardship — Cut, Cap and Balance — that would deliver much larger savings than anything the president has put on the table. Before appreciating why such a program would be better, one must consider why a deal to achieve $4 trillion in savings over the next decade — whatever its contents — would be insufficient.

Given the weak economy, budget savings of $4 trillion will not be implemented immediately, but will be back-loaded with a multiple-year lag. However, estimates made by the Social Security and Medicare trustees and actuaries suggest that those two programs face cumulative, inflation-adjusted, long-term (75-year) fiscal gaps totaling $39.2 trillion. This implicit debt will accrue interest and grow larger over time. The cumulative interest cost of that shortfall over 10 years, under a conservative, inflation-adjusted interest rate of 2.9 percent per year (the rate used by the Social Security actuaries), amounts to $13 trillion — implying that not making any fiscal adjustments for the next 10 years will increase the budgetary imbalance to $52.2 trillion. Thus, scheduling a heavily back-loaded reduction of those costs by just $4 trillion through 2020 is unlikely to improve the federal government’s fiscal condition.

The alternative to increasing the debt limit without sufficiently large spending reductions will amount to kicking the deficit can ahead, to just beyond the 2012 elections.

These are conservative estimates, because they include only shortfalls in entitlement programs and assume that the recent health care reform (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010) will appreciably reduce Medicare’s net unfunded obligations. But these estimates exclude the sizable increases in non-entitlement shortfalls and increases in future state Medicaid costs resulting from health care reform — not to mention the fact that Congress is likely to strike the proposed future reductions in Medicare, as it has routinely done for decades.

Thus, for a 10-year, $4 trillion budget deal to significantly reduce the nation’s long-term fiscal imbalance, we will have to stick to fiscal discipline well beyond 2020, which means not enacting new unfunded entitlement benefits or rapidly increasing spending. The fate of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act, which was abandoned as soon as budget surpluses emerged, does not bode well for a similar deal now unless it is accompanied by constraints against reversals by future Congresses — constraints that the Cut, Cap and Balance program would introduce.

In order to prevent lawmakers from initiating new entitlement (or “investment”) programs with inadequate funding schemes, those constraints should be an integral part of the next budget deal. And such a budget process constraint should itself be protected from repeal except through a large supermajority in Congress. The political price of voting for tax increases to fund new benefits would dampen lawmakers’ enthusiasm to expand entitlements — in contrast to the adoption of the Medicare prescription drug benefit in 2003 or last year’s health care reform, where lawmakers were shielded from the political costs of actually paying for the new programs.

Jagadeesh Gokhale is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, member of the Social Security Advisory Board, and author of Social Security: A Fresh Look at Policy Options University of Chicago Press (2010).

 

More by Jagadeesh Gokhale

The alternative to increasing the debt limit without sufficiently large spending reductions will amount to kicking the deficit can ahead, to just beyond the 2012 elections. We’ll then tolerate fierce campaigns soliciting support for liberal and conservative visions of a long-term budget fix. Chances are, however, that a polarized electorate won’t yield an unambiguous mandate for the direction of fiscal adjustments beyond 2012.

President Obama is exhorting legislators to swallow bitter medicine now because doing so will only become more difficult as the 2012 election draws closer. But had he seized the pro-budget-reform momentum generated by his own Simpson-Bowles deficit reduction commission last year, things may have turned out better for him politically and for the nation economically. Now we may remain in the current policy limbo until after next November, caught between the irresistible force of entitlement spending and the immovable object of Republican opposition to tax increases.

Along the way, we’ll increase the debt limit, one back-loaded bit at a time, without much prospect of avoiding an even larger fiscal calamity down the road. Maybe it’s time for the one sure way of curing this disease: to shred and discard the federal credit card by enacting Cut, Cap and Balance.